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I model the functioning of real-time gross settlement systems for large-
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Then I use the dual programming problem associated with the maximiza-
tion of the total ﬂow of payments in order to determine the shadow-prices of
banks in the payment system. We use these shadow-prices to set personalized
intraday monetary policies such as reserve requirements, availability of Cen-
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less costly in terms of systemic liquidity.
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  31 Introduction
The 1990’s witnessed a worldwide change in the design of payment systems for large-
value transfers. The increase of systemic risk in deferred net settlement systems due
to the increasing value of interbank transfers has been a constant concern for mon-
etary authorities. The Bank for International Settlements has then recommended
the adoption of real-time gross settlement (RTGS) systems for large-value transfers.
In an RTGS system, interbank payments are settled as they are sent by its gross
amount. In other words, no bank can be illiquid any time. This clearly reduces the
time lag between delivery of payment messages and ﬁnal settlement, hence reducing
systemic risk. However, the holding of reserve money becomes a cost for banks.
Indeed, since no illiquidity is allowed during the day, banks have to hold too much
liquidity for settlement purposes. Any miscalculation obliges the bank to obtain
liquidity from other sources, such as Lombard loans from the Central Bank. In or-
der to facilitate the ﬂow of payments and to reduce the opportunity cost of reserve
money and the risk of gridlocks, some systems allow for queueing mechanisms and
splitting of payments. A payment message that is not covered by suﬃcient funds
when it is sent is then queued (and/or split) until the sending bank receives liquidity
from other banks in the system.
The literature has focused on the inﬂuence of payment systems design on the
behavior of banks [see DeBANDT & HARTMANN (2000) for a survey]. We fo-
cus instead on the Central Bank itself. Given the pattern of interbank transfers
[see McANDREWS & RAJAN (2000) for the pattern of transfers and an analy-
sis of it], what is the best design of real-time gross settlement systems? Recent
research has given attention to this question but our approach is quite diﬀerent
[see, for instance, ANGELINI (1998) and ROBERDS (1999)]. The only literature
whose approach to this problem somehow resembles ours is the one on gridlock
resolution [GÜNTZER, JUNGNICKEL & LECLERC (1998), LEINONEN & SO-
R A M Ä K I( 1 9 9 9 ) ,a n dB E C H&S O R A M Ä K I( 2 0 0 1 ) ] .H o w e v e r ,o u rm o d e li sm u c h
more general in that queueing arises endogenously and not as an ad hoc constraint.
  4In addition, the novelty of our approach is the focus on duality theory in order to
determine the shadow-prices of banks and optimal intraday monetary policies.
The question that comes to the mind of everyone who is interested in central
banking and speciﬁcally in the current trend towards the safety of payment systems
is, How to make an RTGS system less costly in terms of liquidity? This question
is actually too general and hides a series of other relevant questions, some of them
dating back even to Bagehot:
• When is it that an increase on initial balances enhances the ﬂow of payments?
• Is it a good idea to extend free intraday credit to illiquid banks?
• Is it worth for the payment system to allow for an overnight loan between two
banks?
• Does the extension of Lombard (collateralized) loans to certain banks really
enhance the ﬂow of payments?
• Can Lombard loans be allocated optimally or else should the Central Bank
provide banks with liquidity whenever it is requested to do so?
• Is there an optimal queueing mechanism that helps minimize aggregate liquid-
ity needs?
• Can an intraday interbank money market replace the Central Bank’s role as
a provider of intraday liquidity?
• How does the failure of an individual bank aﬀect the overall ﬂow of payments?
These questions are too relevant to be put aside. We want to provide a framework
to answering questions as these, one that is simple enough to be applied to real world
policy concerns but economically meaningful. Our answer is, shadow-prices.
We model the problem of optimal systemic liquidity in real-time gross settlement
systems as a linear programming problem. The primal solution gives the optimal
  5queueing arrangement and splitting of payments. The extension of intraday credit
to illiquid banks is also optimally determined. The relevant contribution of our
model lies however on the dual problem associated with the Central Bank’s liq-
uidity management problem. The dual solution gives the shadow-prices of banks.
These shadow-prices can be used by monetary authorities to calculate the eﬀect of
personalized intraday monetary policies, such as reserve requirements, provision of
Lombard loans, net debit caps, the extension of intraday interbank credit exposure,
etc. In addition, shadow-prices help determine intraday monetary policies so as to
bring systemic liquidity down to zero. Therefore, reserve money can be fully used
for settlement purposes, avoiding waste of systemic liquidity. Section 2 presents
the linear programming framework. Section 3 presents the dual program. Section
4 shows how to use shadow-prices and the no-gap theorem to determine liquidity-
eﬃcient intraday monetary policies. In section 5 we suppose that the Central Bank
withdraws its role of the sole provider of intraday credit to illiquid banks and ex-
tend the model to the case of intraday interbank markets. Section 6 presents some
examples and section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Real-Time gross settlement systems
Let B = {1,...,n} be the set of participants in the RTGS payment system, which we
call generically by banks.L e tBi
o be the initial balance of bank i ∈ B on its central
bank account. Denote by Bo = {Bi
o : i ∈ B} the array of initial balances.
The day is divided into a large ﬁnite sequence of periods, T = {to <t 1 < ···<
tK ≡ T},w h e r eto denotes the beginning of the day and tK = T denotes the close of
business. Whenever we say that settlement occurs at period t = tk,i ti n d e e do c c u r s
at time tk, though a payment message said to be sent at period t = tk actually means
a payment message sent within the time interval ∆tk =( tk−1,t k].W ei n t e r p r e tt h i s
interval as the time spent on operational procedures for settlement purposes.
Let {xij(τ):j ∈ B\{i},τ 6 t} be the bank i’s array of outgoing payments at
time t,w h e r exij(τ) is the payment message sent by bank i to the Central Bank at
  6period τ requesting a transfer of xij(τ) units of reserve money from bank i’s account
to bank j’s account. Notice that xii(t) ≡ 0, ∀i ∈ B, ∀t ∈ T, for self-transfers are nil
by deﬁnition. Let m = n2 denote the number of pairs of banks. Once we disregard
self-transfers, we set m = n(n − 1).
According to the Bank for International Settlements [see BIS (1997), report
on RTGS), the measure of intraday liquidity at time t from the individual bank’s
p e r s p e c t i v ei sd e ﬁned by its initial balance plus net receipt of transfers up to time t



















Bank i is said to be illiquid at time t if Li(t) < 0.I fLi(t) > 0,t h e ni ti ss a i dt o
be liquid at time t.
The aggregate net intraday liquidity at time t is given by total initial balances
held on the Central Bank at the beginning of the day minus the total value of queued










i∈B Li(t). Indeed, the sum of net transfers over the set of banks is
identically zero. At any time t, the aggregate net intraday liquidity level depends
only on the initial balances and the current queues of outgoing payments. It does
not depend on the history of queues during the day.
The problem with this deﬁnition is that, even if the aggregate net intraday
liquidity is high, the smooth ﬂow of payments does depend strongly on the queueing
arrangement. For instance, under FIFO (ﬁrst-in ﬁrst-out), whenever balance is not
enough to cover a funds transfer, all remaining queued payments get stuck. Thus,
the actual aggregate net intraday liquidity is lower. The above deﬁnition does
not take this into account. In other words, by not recognizing the role played by
queueing arrangements, the standard deﬁnition of aggregate net intraday liquidity
overestimates aggregate liquidity needs and hence impinges an even higher cost
on individual banks. That means that the standard deﬁnition downestimates the
settlement capacity of the system. It is not able to recognize that the system can
  7work even better than imagined. We interpret the standard deﬁnition as potential
aggregate net intraday liquidity. That would be the overall liquidity level should
every queued payment be settled. Ours is the actual aggregate net intraday liquidity
(or simply systemic liquidity).
In order to set a deﬁnition of aggregate net intraday liquidity that takes queueing
arrangements into account, we have to introduce some notation.
Consider the payment xij(τ) from bank i to bank j at time τ.D e n o t eb yυij(τ,t)
the fraction of xij(τ) that is settled at time t > τ. Call it a settlement function, or
simply a settlement.I f υij(τ,τ)=1 ,t h e np a y m e n txij(τ) is immediately settled
with ﬁnality. If υij(τ,τ)=0and υij(τ,t)=1for some t>τ,t h e np a y m e n txij(τ)




t>τ υij(τ,t) > 0, ∀τ ∈ T
(b) υij(τ,t) ≡ 0, ∀τ >t , ∀t ∈ T
(c)
P
t>τ υij(τ,t) 6 1, ∀τ ∈ T
Condition (a) says that some portion of the payment xij(τ) has to be settled by
the end of the day. Condition (b) says that a payment cannot be settled if it has not
been sent yet. Condition (c) says that any payment has to be at most fully settled
by the end of the day.
When the RTGS system has no centralized queueing facilities, as FEDWIRE,
then the following restriction is added:
(d) υij(τ,t) ≡ 0, ∀τ <t , ∀t ∈ T
Condition (d) above says that a payment cannot be queued and has to be either
rejected or settled at full at the moment it is sent. Denote by V the set of settlements.
There are further restrictions that could be imposed on the settlements. Let
Sij ⊂ R be a nonempty real set. Assume that υij(τ,t) ∈ Sij, ∀i,j ∈ B and ∀τ,t∈ T.
Now consider the following cases:
  8(i) Sij = {0,1}
(ii) Sij =[ 0 ,1]
(iii) Sij =[ aij,b ij],w h e r eaij < 0 and bij > 1
In case (i), the payment xij is either settled at full (at whatever time) or not
s e t t l e da ta l l . I nc a s e( i i ) ,t h ep a y m e n txij can be fractioned. That splitting of
payments is an improvement over 0 − 1 settlement is obvious. One of the possible
causes of gridlock is the fact that payments are indivisible. For instance:
Breaking down transactions enables nearly full usage of system liq-
uidity for settlement purposes at all times. This means that liquidity is
circulating rapidly from bank to bank and that the system is economiz-
ing on its liquidity. Technically, this increases the number of transactions
processed in the system. It may also aid in unwinding a gridlock if there
is some unused liquidity in the system. [Leinonen (1998)]
In case (iii) banks i and j are allowed to make intraday bilateral loans. In other
words, case (iii) refers to an intraday interbank market. Of course, this institution
only makes sense if the Central Bank prevents itself from being the lender of last
resort. The numbers aij < 0 and bij > 1 refer to the extension of intraday bilateral
debt and credit exposures, respectively. These bounds can be set by the Central
Bank as regulatory devices based on whatever measure of soundness.
Obviously some payments are more time-critical than others. This is specially
true about payments related to foreign exchange transactions:
Sequencing transfers is a way of controlling intraday payment ﬂows
by scheduling the timing of outgoing transfers according to the supply of
liquidity provided by incoming transfers. Importantly, to the extent that
incoming and outgoing transfers are successfully sequenced, it could gen-
erate virtual oﬀsetting eﬀects on RTGS payments and hence contribute
  9to substantially reducing the necessary liquidity. The most common way
of sequencing is to use queueing arrangements [...] (italics in the original)
Another way of sequencing transfers may involve message codes in-
dicating the time of day that an individual outgoing transfer should be
settled. (BIS report on RTGS, p. 18, italics added).
Time-critically is easily dealt with by our model. If a payment transfer sent
at period τ∗ h a st ob es e t t l e db e f o r et h ee n do ft h ed a y ,s a y ,a tp e r i o dt∗ with
τ∗ 6 t∗ <T, then the constraint (c) is replaced by
Pt∗
t=τ∗ υij(τ,t) 6 1. This however
will make no serious diﬀerence to the nature of our model. Therefore, we will assume
that no payment is time-critical in that it should be fully settled until the end of
the day but not necessarily before it.
Also for simplicity we will assume that Sij = S,f o rs o m eS as in the cases
considered above, ∀i,j ∈ B.
We propose a modiﬁed concept of aggregate net intraday liquidity. Our concept
takes the role of queueing in an explicit way. The actual aggregate net intraday














Contrary to the standard deﬁnition, the history of settled payments up to time
t does matter for liquidity purposes. Unsettled payments are part of payments that
have to be settled at time t, even though they were sent earlier and queued. Even in
payment systems without centralized queueing facilities, rejected payments have to
be re-sent later. Thus the amount xij(τ) includes both payments being sent at period
τ and rejected payments sent before τ. The only diﬀerence is that in the later case,
the Central Bank cannot distinguish between these two types of payments, whereas
in the former case it can.













We want to make a further modiﬁcation to the deﬁnition above, in order to
take the dynamics of management liquidity by the Central Bank into account. The
systemic liquidity of an RTGS system is given by its total initial balances at the
beginning of the day minus the total value of settleable queued outgoing payments























Our deﬁnition of systemic liquidity makes explicit the role of queueing arrange-
ments in the aggregate net intraday liquidity management by the Central Bank. The
most obvious and reasonable criterion of optimization is that the optimal queue has
to minimize the value of unsettled payments:
The objective of a queueing facility is to optimize queues according
to how time-critical the payments are and to evening out payment ﬂows
over time. [Leinonen (1997)]
The objective function of the Central Bank is to minimize systemic liquidity
needs without violating liquidity constraints of the RTGS system. The lower the
systemic liquidity, the less costly will it be for banks to hold reserves on the Cen-
tral Bank in order to stick to the liquidity constraints imposed by real-time gross
settlement systems.
The liquidity constraint of an RTGS system is that no bank can be illiquid any
time.
In RTGS systems, banks have to hold enough balance throughout the day to
settle interbank payments. Overdrafts are not allowed. At each period t, individual
reserves are given by individual initial balances plus net transfers up to time t.
Period t is not included. Thus, individual banks face a cash-in-advance (or Clower)
constraint. According to Clower’s (1967) seminal paper:
  11[T]he total value of goods demanded cannot in any circumstances ex-
ceed the amount of money held by the transactor at the outset of the
period. [Clower (1967)] (Italics in the original)
Though Clower meant goods demanded by consumers in a monetary economy,
the nature of such liquidity constraints is the same one faced by banks in an RTGS
system, the diﬀerence being only that the objective function is linear and that the
goods we are dealing with are settlement functions.
In order to write down the liquidity constraints, it is important to decompose
`(t) into `(t)=
P




















The amount `i(t) is the liquidity level of bank i at period t. Thus the liquidity
constraint faced by bank i at period t is `i(t) > 0, which means that no overdraft is
allowed.



















τ6t υij(τ,t)xij(τ),f o rt ∈ T\{to}
Thus liquidity constraints simply say that at any time:
total transfer = current transfer + (a fraction of) previously unsettled transfers
Systemic liquidity is always nonnegative, since no bank can be illiquid in an
RTGS system. The best situation arises when systemic liquidity is zero, for total
reserves will then be suﬃcient to cover total outﬂow throughout the day (possibly
through transfers across periods, that is, through queueing and Lombard loans). We
deﬁne such a situation as liquidity-eﬃciency.
  12Deﬁnition 1 An RTGS system is said to be liquidity-eﬃcient (or simply Λ-eﬃcient)
if systemic liquidity is zero: Λ =0 .
Whenever an RTGS is not Λ-eﬃcient, some liquidity is being unused, that is,
some payments are not being settled even though there is suﬃcient liquidity in
the system for settlement purposes. Λ-eﬃciency requires that total reserves be














Since the array of initial balance is given, the minimization of systemic liquidity










We will show that we can always deﬁne appropriate vectors x and υ,f o re a c hd i ﬀerent
type of RTGS system, such that systemic liquidity is x · υ.
Our deﬁnition of systemic liquidity shows that it is not correct to say that a safe
payment system is one with total reserves high enough to cover the total cumulated
ﬂow of interbank payments throughout the day. In order to cover total payments, it
suﬃces that total reserves cover the average total outﬂow (over time). The rest of
the work is done by the settlement function, that is, by the queueing and settlement
arrangement.
Ab a n kt h a tp a r t i c i p a t e si na nR T G Ss y s t e mh a sf o u rd i ﬀerent sources of funds:
balances on its Central Bank account, incoming transfers from other participants,
collateralized intraday credit extensions from the Central Bank (also called Lombard
loans), and interbank money market funds (such as overnight and term loans). So
far we have considered only the ﬁrst two sources.
If πi(t) is a Lombard loan given to bank i at period t, then its liquidity constraint







































if t = T.H e r eπi(T) >
P
t<T(1 + ri(t))πi(t), since in the end of the day individual
b a n k sh a v et op a yb a c kt h el o a np l u ss o m em a r g i ng i v e nb yi n t e r e s tr a t e so rh a i r c u t s .
Thus πi(T) is actually a debt.
Since these are interest rates on loans made against collateral in the form of
repurchase agreements, we call them repo interest rates.F o re a c ht ∈ T\{T},d e ﬁne
r(t)=( r1(t),...,rn(t)) and let r = {r(t):t ∈ T\{T}} be the array of repo interest
rates.
Assume that the Central Bank has a ﬁxed amount M>0 of money that can be
lent to temporarily illiquid banks against collateral throughout the day. Let Mi > 0
b et h et o t a la m o u n to fm o n e yt h a tt h eC e n t r a lB a n ki sa b l et ol e n dt ob a n ki ∈ B.
Obviously
P
i∈B Mi = M. If we qualify π by banks and period, then we might
assume that the credit constraints for each bank are given by:
(C1) 0 6 πi(to) 6 Mi
(C2) 0 6 πi(tk) 6 Mi −
Pk−1
`=0 πi(t`), 1 6 k 6 K − 1
(C3) πi(tK) >
PK−1
`=0 (1 + ri(t))πi(t`).
Let π =( π(to),...,π(tK)) ∈ Rn(K+1) be the vector of Lombard loans from the
Central Bank, where π(t)=( π1(t),...,πn(t)) ∈ Rn, ∀t ∈ T.D e n o t eb yΠ the set of
vectors satisfying the credit constraints.
Consider the case S =[ 0 ,1]. The Central Bank’s problem is to minimize systemic
liquidity subject to liquidity and credit constraints. Equivalently, it seeks to max-
imize the total cumulated ﬂow of interbank payments subject to those constraints.
  14The most general problem can be stated as follows:

                     





























+αtπi(t), t ∈ T\{to}
αt =
½




τ>t υij(t,τ) 6 1,∀t ∈ T,∀i,j ∈ B
0 6 υij(τ,t) 6 1
0 6 πi(to) 6 Mi
πi(tk) 6 Mi −
Pk−1
`=0 πi(t`), 1 6 k 6 K − 1
πi(tK) >
PK−1
`=0 (1 + ri(t`))πi(t`)
πi(t) > 0,∀i ∈ B,∀t ∈ T


















        

0 ··· 0




. . . ... . . .
0 ··· 0






Now consider the following partitioned n × n2-matrix:
X(t)=
£














What Yi(t) does is to diagonalize the vector of outgoing payments from bank i
at time t.N o w ,d e ﬁne the following partitioned n × n2-matrix:
Y (t)=
£
Y1(t) |· · ·| Yn(t)
¤
n×n2
  15The matrix of coeﬃcients of the liquidity constraints in an RTGS system with
queueing is given by the following n(K +1 )× n2 1
2 (K +2 )( K +1 ) -matrix1:
Q =

      

X(to) 0n 0n ··· 0n ··· 0n
X(to) − Y (to) X(to) X(t1) ··· 0n ··· 0n
X(to) − Y (to) X(to) − Y (to) X(t1) − Y (t1) ··· 0n ··· 0n
. . .
. . .
. . . ... . . .
. . .
. . .
X(to) − Y (to) X(to) − Y (to) X(t1) − Y (t1) ··· 0n ··· 0n
X(to) − Y (to) X(to) − Y (to) X(t1) − Y (t1) ··· X(to) ··· X(tK)

      

Then matrix Q (the matrix of interbank payments with queueing) is a block lower
triangular matrix deﬁned by Q =[ Qαβ],w h e r ee a c hQαβ is a n × n2-submatrix2,





X(t`) if α = k +1and β =
(k+`+1)(k+`+2)
2 , 0 6 ` 6 k
X(t`) − Y (t`) if α > k +2and β =
(k+`+1)(k+`+2)
2 , 0 6 ` 6 k
0n otherwise
Thus, given k =0 ,1,...,K,w ec a nﬁnd, for any chosen 0 6 ` 6 k, the submatrix
Qαβ,f o ra n y 3 1 6 α,β 6 K +1 .
For any i ∈ B and any t ∈ T,l e tυi(τ,t)=( υi1(τ,t),...,υin(τ,t)) be the portion
of the large-value transfers xi(t)=( xi1(t),...,x 1n(t)) ∈ Rn from bank i to every
o t h e rb a n ks e n ta tt i m eτ and settled at time t, ∀to 6 τ 6 t,∀t ∈ T.D e ﬁne:
υ(tk)=( ( υi(to,t k))16i6n,(υi(t1,t k))16i6n,...,(υi(tk,t k))16i6n) ∈ R
n+2n+3n+...+(k+1)n
Now consider the vector:
υ =( υ(to),...,υ(tK)) ∈ R
n2 1
2(K+2)(K+1)
1The number of columns in matrix Q with queueing is n2 1
2(K +2 ) ( K +1 ) .C o m p a r e t h i s
with matrix A without queueing, where the number of columns is n2(K +1 ) . This is because,
with queueing, in each period, the central bank settles (fractions of) payments sent at that same
period plus (fractions of) unsettled payments carried over from previous periods. Thus, if at to,
the central bank settles n payments, then at t1 it settles 2n (n from t1 plus n from to), at t2
it settles 3n, and so on. Since there are K +1periods, the number of columns with queueing is
n2+2n2+···+(K+1)n2 = n2 1
2(K+2)(K+1). If we disregard self-transfers, the actual dimension
of Q is n(K +1 )× n(n − 1)1
2(K +2 ) ( K +1 ) .
2If we disregard self-transfers, the actual dimension of Qαβ is n × n(n − 1).
3The number β is given by β =1+( 1+2+3+... + k + `)=
(k+`+1)(k+`+2)
2 , 0 6 ` 6 k.
  16Given xi(t), deﬁne x(t)=( x1(t),...,xn(t)) ∈ Rn2 and set:
← − x (tk)=( x(to),...,x(tk)) = (x(t`))to6`6tk ∈ R
(k+1)n2
,1 6 k 6 K
Deﬁne:
x =( ← − x (to),← − x (t1),...,← − x (tK)) ∈ R
n2 1
2(K+2)(K+1)
Let Bo =( B1
o,...,Bn












Now it is easy to see that:










and, if no Lombard loans were available, that liquidity constraints would be repre-
sented by Qυ 6 b.
The following n2(K+1)×n2 1




    

In2 In2 0 In2 00 ··· In2 00 0 0
00 In2 0 In2 0 ··· 0 In2 000











000000 ··· 000 0 In2

    







¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
I2n2
0(K−1)n2×2n2
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
···
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
IKn2
0n2×Kn2




Denote by 1 the n2 1
2 (K +2 )( K +1 ) -vector of 1’s. Therefore, we have Jυ 6 1.
Notice that we considered self-transfers xii(t), ∀i ∈ B, ∀t ∈ T, for the sake of
simplicity only. In practice, the dimension of the matrices above is reduced once
4If we disregard self-transfers, the actual dimension of J is n(n − 1)(K +1 )× n(n − 1)1
2(K +
2)(K +1 ) .
5The dimension of the submatrix 0 is obvious.
  17we disregard self-transfers, xii(t), and υii(τ,t). In this case, we just replace n2 by
n2 − n, whenever such replacement is applicable.
In order to express the problem above in matrix form in the proper way, we
still have to ﬁnd the matrix representation of Lombard loans and credit constraints
included. Deﬁne the following n(K +1 )× n(K +1 ) -matrix:
C =

    

−In 0 ··· 00
0 −In ··· 00
. . .
. . . ... . . .
. . .
00 ··· −In 0
00 ··· 0 In

    

Deﬁne the n(K +1 )× n(K +1 ) -matrix:
H =

    

In 0 ··· 00
In In ··· 00
. . .
. . . ... . . .
. . .
In In ··· In 0
In In ··· In −In

    

Matrix H describes the coeﬃcients of the credit constraints if no repo rates are




Kt i m e s
∈ R
nK
and deﬁne ¯ m =( mo,0) ∈ Rn(K+1),w h e r e0 ∈ Rn. Then the credit constraints can
be written as:





Therefore, in matrix form, we can write the Central Bank’s primal problem as:
(P)

    
    































  18has dimension n(2 + n)(K +1 )× 1





K +1 if n =1and K > 2 (trivial case)
10 if n =2and k =2
n(n +1 )( K +1 ) otherwise
When credit is priced, matrix H requires a slight modiﬁcation. Let R(t) be a






0 r2(t) ··· 0
. . .





Deﬁne the n(K +1 )× n(K +1 ) -matrix:
R =

    

In 0 ··· 00
In In ··· 00
. . .
. . . ... . . .
. . .
In In ··· In 0
In + R(to) In + R(t1) ··· In + R(tK−1) −In

    

The primal problem with repo rates is:
(P)

    
    






















Deﬁnition 2 A optimizing real-time gross settlement system (or simply an opti-
mizing RTGS system) is a collection {(Bo,x,υ,S),(P)} of parameters (Bo,x,υ,S)
paired with the primal problem (P) above.
Deﬁnition 3 Let {(Bo,x,υ,S),(P)} be an optimizing RTGS system. A systemic
monetary policy for {(Bo,x,υ,S),(P)} is a vector (Bo,M,π,r), where Bo = {Bi
o :
i ∈ B} is the array of initial balances, M is the vector of credit lines, π is a vector
of Lombard loans, and r is the vector of repo interest rates. A systemic monetary
policy (B∗
o,M∗,π∗,r ∗) is Λ-eﬃcient if it makes the RTGS system Λ-eﬃcient.
  193 Shadow-prices of banks
Given the matrix formulation of the primal problem, we can easily get the dual
problem associated with it. The solution to the dual will give us the shadow-prices
o fb a n k si na nR T G Ss y s t e m .
When no repo rate is charged, the dual is:
(D)

    
    

















where λ is the vector of shadow-prices associated with liquidity constraints, µ is the
vector of shadow-prices associated with consistency constraints, and ξ is the vector
of shadow-prices associated with credit constraints. Here, Q> is the transpose of Q,
and similarly for the other matrices.
From the ﬁrst set of dual constraints, Q>λ + J>µ > x, we get, after careful






θ=k+1[λi(tθ) − λj(tθ)]} + µij(t`) > xij(t`), ∀k =0 ,...,K− 1,
∀` =0 ,...,k
xij(t`)λi(tK)+µij(t`) > xij(t`),k = K,∀` =0 ,...,K







θ=k+1[λi(tθ) − λj(tθ)] +
µij(t`)




xij(t`) > 1,k = K,∀` =0 ,...,K
The dual constraints above are in a more intuitive form, specially because the
shadow-price µij(t`) associated to consistency constraints needs to be interpreted
more carefully. Usually the settlement function lies in the interval [0,1], for it is
a percentage-type variable. Even when it takes values outside [0,1], its correct
interpretation still is as a percentage-type variable. Thus (omitting the indices i
and j and the arguments s and t for simplicity) a unit increase from υ =1to υ =2
  20means a 100% increase, that is, a change from a payment of x to 2x.I f w e w a n t
to ﬁnd the eﬀect of a dollar increase, we have to divide µ by x.S i n c eυij(s,t) is a
“percentage variable”, the eﬀect of a dollar increase on the total amount xij(s) to









θ=k ξi(tθ) > 0, ∀k =0 ,...,K − 1, ∀i ∈ B
λi(tK) − ξi(tK) > 0, for k = K, ∀i ∈ B
Hence the dual problem can be rewritten as:

      



















θ=t+1[λi(θ) − λj(θ)]} + µij(τ) > xij(τ),∀t<T,∀τ 6 t
xij(τ)λi(T)+µij(τ) > xij(τ),∀τ ∈ T
−λi(t)+
PT
θ=t ξi(θ) > 0,∀t<T
λi(T) − ξi(T) > 0, ∀i,j ∈ B
(λ,µ,ξ) > 0
Consider a payment xij(τ) from bank i to bank j made at period τ. The period
t > τ economic value of this payment is decomposed into two values:
• I t sf a c ev a l u e ,xij(τ), multiplied by a corrective factor: bank i’s current liq-
uidity shadow-price, λi(t), plus an adjusted future bilateral net price between
banks i and j,
PT
θ=t+1[λi(θ) − λj(θ)].
• To all this it is added the consistency shadow-price, µij(τ), associated with
the splitting and queueing of the payment xij(τ).
Thus the economic value of a payment varies as the day passes by. The economic
v a l u eo fap a y m e n ti sa na ﬃne transformation of its face value. The additive factor
is attached to the payment once it is sent, but the multiplicative factor (the slope)
varies with time.































Thus, each initial balance, Bi
o, is multiplied by the cumulated shadow-price,
P
t∈Tλi(t).
Initial reserves are set at the beginning of the day, i.e., before period to. It is not
possible to change initial balances after that. Then the eﬀect of a dollar increase on
initial reserves is the sum of the eﬀects period by period. Intuitively, a dollar change
of initial reserves is equivalent to a unit change of the constant on the right hand
side of the liquidity constraints period by period. Therefore, the ﬁrst term reﬂects
the eﬀect of changes in initial reserves.
Usually, the Central Bank set initial reserves so as to conform them with medium
and long-run macroeconomic monetary policies, such as inﬂation targets, and so on.
However, for the payment system itself, it is important that monetary authorities
consider the consequences of reserve requirements in the very short-run on a day-
by-day basis.
If the Central Bank knew the shadow-prices associated with liquidity constraints
of individual banks, it would be able to require higher or lower reserves from the
right set of banks. Requiring higher reserves from banks with zero shadow-prices











Imagine that each bank begins the day with a certain amount of money, Mi,t h a t
c a nb el e n tt oi tb yt h eC e n t r a lB a n k .T h et o t a le ﬀect of a dollar increase of credit
is given by the sum of the eﬀects period by period. The last period is naturally
excluded from this calculation for the very simple reason that at the last period no
credit is extended: it is the time to pay back any Lombard loans eventually received.
Thus the last term reﬂects the overall eﬀect of changes in the total amount of credit
that the Central Bank makes available to each bank. In other words, it measures







t∈T µij(t), is the total shadow-price of consis-
tency constraints. Notice that its dimension is the same as the dimension of pay-
  22ments. Imagine that a bank sends a payment at some period and that it is fully
paid by the end of the day, so that, the corresponding consistency constraint is
biding. What is the eﬀect of allowing such bank to transfer an extra dollar to the
receiving bank? The answer is given by the corresponding consistency shadow-price.
Therefore the middle term measures the eﬀect of intraday loans between individual
banks.
When repo rates are charged, the dual is:
(D)

    
    



















      



















θ=t+1[λi(θ) − λj(θ)]} + µij(τ) > xij(τ),∀t<T,∀τ 6 t
xij(τ)λi(T)+µij(τ) > xij(τ),∀τ ∈ T
−λi(t)+
PT−1
θ=t ξi(θ)+( 1+ri(t))ξi(T) > 0,∀t<T
λi(T) − ξi(T) > 0, ∀i,j ∈ B
(λ,µ,ξ) > 0
4 Liquidity-eﬃcient systemic monetary policies
Let (λ,µ,ξ) be a solution to the dual problem, that is, the set of shadow-prices.
The vector λ gives the shadow-prices of initial reserve requirements. The vector µ
gives the shadow-prices of queueing and splitting. Finally, the vector ξ gives the
shadow-prices of credit extensions. Now consider the dual value function, i.e., the





















In the deﬁnition just set (with some abuse of notation), the control variables are
initial reserves (the Bi
o’s), the extent of intraday interbank exposures (the 1’s), and
intraday credit lines available to banks (the Mi’s). Repo interest rates are also a
  23control variable, though they appear only in the constraints, not in the dual value
function.
Recall that the primal value function (omitting stars representing optimal primal

































TP(υ,π). If there is no duality gap,




TD(Bo,M).T h u s



































are the average shadow-prices (throughout the day). This is the fundamental equa-
tion for liquidity-eﬃciency. It shows how reserve requirements, amounts of intraday
credit made available to individual banks, and the extension of interbank exposure
can be used to achieve liquidity-eﬃciency by means of shadow-prices. Notice that in-
traday interest rates on Lombard loans is also a control variable, even though it does
not appear explicitly in the dual value function. It is hidden in the dual constraints,
  24but can certainly be set by the Central Bank so as to achieve liquidity-eﬃciency as
well.
If the Central Bank knew the shadow-prices, it would be able to set intraday
monetary policies in the best possible way.
Sometimes the Central Bank decides to increase reserve requirements in order
to smooth out the ﬂow of payments or to decrease them in order to economize on
unnecessary liquidity. Our model shows that such policy may be costly in terms
of liquidity. All depends on shadow-prices. If a bank has zero shadow-price, every
extra dollar required from it will not enhance the ﬂow of payments. The opportunity
cost of such extra reserve money will represent a deadweight loss for the economy.
On the other hand, if a bank has a high shadow-price, any extra dollar required
from it will enhance the ﬂow of payments by something more than a dollar. Then
it is less costly for the Central Bank to require higher reserves from the right set of
b a n k s .I nt h ee n d ,i tw i l lg e tt h ea m o u n to fe x t r ar e s e r v e si tw a n t sw i t h o u tc r e a t i n g
deadweight losses.
Let us ﬁrst analyze a very simple situation in which no Lombard loans are needed.
Usually a speciﬁc amount of initial reserves is set one day (for whatever purposes)
and is not changed for some time until new initial reserves are required. If the
Central Bank knew the pattern of payments and consequently the shadow-prices,
then, in the simple case just mentioned, the Central Bank will want to require new
reserves in such a way as to get Λ-eﬃciency. When the Central Bank realizes that
Λ > 0, then some liquidity is not being used for settlement purposes. Our ﬁrst
reaction would be to change reserve requirements by Λ
n, for every bank. But this is
not a good idea. For instance, a bank with zero shadow-price will simply loose the
amount Λ
n, if this is an additional reserve, or the Central Bank will simply loose the
same amount if this is a decrease of reserve requirements.
Suppose, for instance, that the only source of intraday liquidity, besides net
  25transfers, is the amount of initial reserves. If systemic liquidity is positive, then:











This means that some reserve money is not been used for settlement purposes,
that is, some payments could be settled, but are not. How could the Central Bank
set reserve requirements so as to reduce systemic liquidity and make the RTGS
system as close as possible to a DNS system with no systemic risk? In this simple




















o(1 − ¯ λk) −
P
j∈B ¯ µkj} −
P
j∈B ¯ µij
¯ λi−1 if i ∈ B1
Bi
o if i ∈ Bo
Here, B1 = {i : ¯ λi > 1} is the set of banks with average liquidity shadow-price
strictly above unity and Bo = {i :06 ¯ λi 6 1} = B\B1 is the rest of banks. The
above solution says that banks with low shadow-prices are required to keep their
historical reserve balance, but banks with high shadow-prices are required to change
initial reserves to Bi∗
o .
Whenever systemic liquidity has to be reduced, the Central Bank wants to keep
initial reserve levels of those banks with average shadow-prices below unity and to
change reserve requirements of banks with average shadow-price above unity. The
higher the shadow-price of a bank, the lower the change of reserve.
Suppose total reserves have to be decreased. Pick a bank with shadow-price
above unity. Then its contribution to aggregate liquidity is its initial balance plus
its average marginal contribution from liquidity constraints. What is left over if this
bank were not in the system is Λ − Bi
o(¯ λi − 1). This amount is split equally among
all banks with average shadow-price above unity, and hence each share is weighed
according to the inverse of the excess of the respective shadow-price over and above
unity, i.e., ¯ λi − 1. The resulting amount is the ﬁrst term of the new reserve level,
  26Λ−Bi
o(¯ λi−1)
(¯ λi−1)#B1 . To this it is added the following. Consider the total contribution of every
other bank with shadow-price above unity. This is given by their initial reserves plus
marginal contribution from liquidity constraints plus marginal contributions from
queued and eventually settled payments to everybody else. This amount is split
among the banks with shadow-price above unity and again weighed according to
t h ei n v e r s eo ft h ee x c e s so fs h a d o w - p r i c eo v e ra n da b o v eu n i t y .
Among other things, the Central Bank can estimate the eﬀect of diﬀerent in-
traday credit policies. For instance, what happens when some bank is allowed to
use net debit caps? Suppose the Central Bank could reward some banks with net
debit caps. Let Di(t) be the extension of net debit cap that the Central Bank allows
bank i to incur at time t. It can clearly be reinterpreted as a monetary amount
added to initial reserve requirements at each time during the day. Shadow-prices

























Suppose, for example, that there are no Lombard loans and that net debit caps
a r ec o n s t a n t ,i . e . ,b a n k sh a v et h es a m en e td e b i tc a p ,s a y ¯ Di(t)=D>0. If Λ > 0,
how can the Central Bank set D? Consider systemic liquidity before the introduction











¯ µij > 0
























j∈B ¯ µij P
i∈B ¯ λi
Since the solution above does not depend on the name of the bank, then either
e v e r yb a n kw i l lb eg r a n t e dt h es a m en e td e b i tc a po rt h es a m et a x .

















i ¯ λi =0









Notice that some banks will get net debit caps, which amount to a form of
intraday subsidy from the Central Bank, whereas other banks will have to pay
taxes. Indeed, depending on the shadow-prices, D∗
i may be positive or negative.
Thus net debit caps should be ﬁnanced by banks themselves through redistribution
of liquidity. While some banks get net debit caps, other banks get a positive lower
bound on current balance during the day.
From a political point of view, it is better to give banks with low shadow-prices
no debit caps and to set another level of net debit caps for banks with high shadow-
prices. Of course, banks with high shadow-prices will have to fully bear the costs of
other banks not paying taxes. Again, consider B1 = {i : ¯ λi > 1}, the set of banks
with average liquidity shadow-price strictly above unity and Bo = {i :06 ¯ λi 6













o(1 − ¯ λk) −
P
j∈B ¯ µkj} if i ∈ B1
0 if i ∈ Bo
Comparing this result with the previous one, we see that net debit caps are
reduced by the amount given by the second term. The amount of reduction is
  28exactly the amount of taxes not paid by banks with low shadow-prices divided
equally among banks with high shadow-prices and weighed by the inverse of the
average liquidity shadow-prices. Thus banks with even higher shadow-prices are
rewarded with a lower reduction of net debit caps, whereas banks with not so high
shadow-prices are punished with a higher reduction of net debit caps.
5 Intraday interbank market
One of the key roles of the Central Bank is to extend credit lines to banks that
become illiquid within the day. Usually such credit extension is a collateralized loan
in the form of repurchase agreements: the illiquid bank sells securities to the Central
Bank and commits itself to buying them back until the end of the day. This is an
intraday money market in which the Central Bank is the sole seller of liquidity and
every individual bank is a buyer.
The interbank market, contrariwise, functions on an overnight basis. Individual
banks lend to each other from one day to the next. We are not interested in this
overnight interbank market, but rather on the possibility of an intraday interbank
market. Such money market only makes sense in settlement systems where the
Central Bank prevents itself from extending intraday funds to illiquid banks, hence
transferring all the costs of liquidity provision to the private sector. Such market
did actually exist for some time in the Swiss system (SIC). The Swiss Central Bank
has recently nevertheless resumed its role of seller of intraday funds, so that the
small-scaled Swiss intraday interbank market had indeed a short life.
The main characteristic of an intraday interbank money market through the
RTGS payment system is the bilateral credit exposure between banks. For instance,
if bank i has to send xij dollars to bank j at time t, but actually sends xij + yij,
then yij can be interpreted as a loan from bank i to bank j. A simpler formulation,
and one that ﬁts our notation perfectly, is to allow the settlement function υ to
take values beyond the interval [0,1].I fb a n ki sends a payment xij to bank j and
the settlement function takes the value υij =1 .1,t h e nb a n ki settles its payment
  29and lends 0.1xij to bank j.I fb a n kj has to send a payment xji but the settlement
function takes the value υji = −0.2,t h e nb a n kj does not settle its payment and
gets a loan of 0.2xji from bank i.W er e g a r dt h el o a n s0.1xij and 0.2xji as separate
loans from bank i to bank j, even if they occur at the same time and the origins of
the ﬂow are not the same. Intraday interbank loans can be optimally determined
provided we impose upper and lower bounds on the values taken by the settlement
function and the consistency condition.
The interpretation of the bounds mentioned above is straightforward. They rep-
resent the maximum credit exposures, in percentage terms, that pairs of individual
banks can take bilaterally. These bounds can be set up by the banks involved them-
selves or by the Central Bank. In either case, the shadow prices associated with
such constraints will tell us the worth of a variation of the maximum bilateral credit
exposure.
Let Eij > 0 be the maximum credit exposure in the bilateral transaction be-





ij(t,τ),w h e r eυ
+
ij(t,τ) > 0 is the positive part and υ
−
ij(t,τ) > 0,
is the negative part of υij(t,τ), respectively. Then the limited credit exposure is rep-
















If the bounds are not in percentage terms but rather in absolute value, that is,
if the maximum credit exposure of bank i to bank j is set up, for instance, by a
fraction of capital adequacy level or any other criterion, then we have −eij − xij 6
υijxij − xij 6 eij. Therefore, provided xij > 0:
−eij
xij
6 υij 6 1+
eij
xij
In this case, we just have to replace Eij by
eij
xij. Hence there is no loss of generality
in assuming that credit exposure is in percentage terms.
Therefore, the Central Bank’s liquidity management problem in an RTGS system
  30with queueing and intraday interbank money market is:

             















































































ij(t,τ) > 0,∀t ∈ T,∀τ ∈ {t,...,T},∀i ∈ B
We will now ﬁnd the matrix representation of the problem above. For any i ∈ B






in(τ,t)) be the positive part of the
portion of the large-value transfers xi(t)=( xi1(t),...,x1n(t)) from bank i to every






i (tk,t k))16i6n) ∈ R
n+2n+3n+...+(k+1)n







After disregarding self-transfers, the actual dimension of the vector υ+ is given
by n(n−1)1
















Notice that the actual dimension of υ is much smaller, n(n−1)(K +2 )( K +1 ).
Given the bounds Eij, set Ei =( Ei1,...,E in) and deﬁne e =( E1,...,En).T h e r e -
  31fore the matrix representation of the primal problem is:

      
      




























Hence we have four sets of constraints: liquidity constraints, consistency con-
straints, upper-boundedness constraints, and lower-boundedness constraints. For
each of these, consider the respective vector of shadow-prices: λ,µ,ζ,η.
The dual is:

      
      
min(λ,µ,ζ,η) b · λ + 1 · µ +( 1 + e) · ζ + e · η
s.t.
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θ=k+1[λi(tθ) − λj(tθ)]} + µij(t`)+ζij(t`,t k) − ηij(t`,t k)=xij(t`),
∀k =0 ,1,...,K − 1,∀` =0 ,1,...,k
xij(t`)λi(tK)+µij(t`)+ζij(t`,t k) − ηij(t`,t k)=xij(t`),k = K,∀` =0 ,1,...,K












































Liquidity-eﬃciency can obviously be implemented through the equation:
b · 1 − b · λ − 1 · µ − (1 + e) · ζ − e · η =0
Among other things, the shadow-prices show how to control the extent of in-
terbank intraday exposures (the control variable e) so as to implement liquidity-
eﬃciency. Suppose the Central Bank cannot discriminate banks through reserve
  32requirements, and that payments have to be settled at full by the end of the day.
Then the only control of systemic liquidity is the extent of interbank intraday ex-
posure. In order to achieve liquidity-eﬃciency, we have to calculate the extension of






o(1 − ¯ λi) − ¯ µij − ¯ ζij
¯ ζij − ¯ ηij
provided ¯ ζij 6=¯ ηij, ∀i,j ∈ B.
6E x a m p l e s
In this section we give some examples to illustrate our results. Consider the following
RTGS system. There are two banks, B = {1,2}, and the business day is divided
into three periods, T = {to,t 1,t 2},w h i c hw ec a l lmorning, noon,a n dend of the day,
respectively. The Central Bank has no uncertainty as to the amounts that banks will
transfer to each other throughout the day. The pattern of transfers is represented
















Each entry xij(t) is to be read as “bank i transfers xij(t) dollars to bank j
at period t”. Clearly diagonal entries are set equal to zero, for banks do not do
self-transfers.
Initial balances are given by B1
o =1 0 0and B2
o =1 2 0 . T h e s ea r et h er e s e r v e s
banks are required to hold at their Central Bank accounts at the beginning of the
day.
The Central Bank has a certain amount of money, say $130, to lend to temporar-
ily illiquid banks. Suppose that it has M1 =5 0available for lending to bank 1 and
M2 =8 0available for lending to bank 2.
  33The ﬁr s ts i t u a t i o nw ew i l la n a l y z ei st h ec h o i c eb e t w e e n( a )a nR T G Ss y s t e m
with no centralized queueing facilities, as FEDWIRE, and in which intraday credit
i se x t e n d e db yt h eC e n t r a lB a n ka saw a yt os m o o t ho u tl i q u i d i t yp r o b l e m s ,a n d( b )
an RTGS system in which the Central Bank does not provide intraday liquidity but
unfunded payments can be queued and fractioned. We will show that both systems
y i e l d st h es a m ea m o u n to fw a s t eo fr e s e r v em o n e y .T h e nw es h o wt h a t( c )w h e nt h e
provision of intraday liquidity is shifted down to individual banks via an intraday
interbank market, liquidity-eﬃciency is achieved and no reserve money is wasted.
Finally, we illustrate (d) the setting up of personalized net debit caps.
6.1 Queueing, no Lombard loans
T h ec h o i c ev a r i a b l ei sυij(s,t), which represents the portion of the payment xij(s)
from bank i to bank j at period s that will be settled at period t > s.
The primal problem is:

                                  
                                  
max 80υ12(to,t o)+8 0 υ12(to,t 1)+8 0 υ12(to,t 2)+1 2 0 υ21(to,t o)+
+120υ21(to,t 1)+1 2 0 υ21(to,t 2)+1 8 0 υ12(t1,t 1)+1 8 0 υ12(t1,t 2)+
+120υ21(t1,t 1)+1 2 0 υ21(t1,t 2)+1 0 0 υ12(t2,t 2)+1 2 0 υ21(t2,t 2)
s.t. 80υ12(to,t o) 6 100
120υ21(to,t o) 6 120
80υ12(to,t 1)+1 8 0 υ12(t1,t 1) 6 100 + 120υ21(to,t o) − 80υ12(to,t o)
120υ21(to,t 1) + 120υ21(t1,t 1) 6 120 + 80υ12(to,t o) − 120υ21(to,t o)
80υ12(to,t 2)+1 8 0 υ12(t1,t 2)+1 0 0 υ12(t2,t 2) 6
6 100 + 120υ21(to,t o)+1 2 0 υ21(to,t 1)+1 2 0 υ21(t1,t 1)−
−80υ12(to,t o) − 80υ12(to,t 1) − 180υ12(t1,t 1)
120υ21(to,t 2) + 120υ21(t1,t 2)+1 2 0 υ21(t2,t 2) 6
6 120 + 80υ12(to,t o)+8 0 υ12(to,t 1)+1 8 0 υ12(t1,t 1)−
−120υ21(to,t o) − 120υ21(to,t 1) − 120υ21(t1,t 1)
υ12(to,t o)+υ12(to,t 1)+υ12(to,t 2) 6 1
υ21(to,t o)+υ21(to,t 1)+υ21(to,t 2) 6 1
υ12(t1,t 1)+υ12(t1,t 2) 6 1
υ21(t1,t 1)+υ21(t1,t 2) 6 1
υ12(t2,t 2) 6 1
υ21(t2,t 2) 6 1
υij(s,t) > 0, ∀t > s
To understand the constraints (which we call liquidity constraints), take, for
  34instance, the third one:
80υ12(to,t 1)+1 8 0 υ12(t1,t 1) 6 100 + 120υ21(to,t o) − 80υ12(to,t o)
At noon, t1,b a n k1 sends x12(t1)=1 8 0to bank 2. A fraction υ12(t1,t 1) of
it will be settled at noon. Besides, a fraction υ12(to,t 1) of the payment sent in
the morning, x12(to)=8 0 , is scheduled to be settled at noon. Thus, the value
of outgoing payments from bank 1 to bank 2 at noon is the left-hand side of the
constraint above. The right-hand side is the sum of two things: initial balance,
B1
o = 100, plus net transfers received before noon. That is, in the morning, bank
1 sent 80υ12(to,t o) to bank 2 and received 120υ21(to,t o) from bank 2,s ot h a tn e t
transfers become 120υ21(to,t o) − 80υ12(to,t o). The same reasoning applies to both
banks every period.
The optimal settlement is:















































                 

Thus υ∗
12(to,t o)=1means that the payment x12(to)=8 0sent by bank 1 to





3. These numbers mean that 2
3 of the payment x21(t1)=1 2 0sent by
bank 2 to bank 1 at noon (that is, $80) is settled at noon, while the remaining
fraction, 1
3, is settled at the end of the day (that is, $40).

























Therefore, $6.67 of reserve money remains unused. This represents a waste of
liquidity. In other words, the money is in there, but is not being used.
T h ed u a lp r o g r a mg i v e su st h ef o l l o w i n gs h a d o w - p r i c e s :





















































                 

The dual value is 640, so there is no duality gap. Morning payments are fully
settled. Bank 2’s noon payment is queued and fully settled by the end of the day.
Bank 1’s noon payment is partially settled. The unsettled amount is 1
9×$180 = $20.
Bank 1’s end of the day payment is partially settled as well. The unsettled amount is
1
5×$100 = $20. Bank 2’s end of the day payment is partially settled and the unsettled
amount is 1
6 ×$120 = $20. Thus bank 1 would have to have its reserve requirements






1(t2)) = $40,t h a t
is, $20. On the other hand, bank 2 would have to have its reserve requirements






2(t2)) = $20,t h a t
is, $10. Therefore, if bank 1’s initial reserves were $120 (instead of $100) and bank
2’s initial reserves were $130 (instead of $120), the system would be able to settle
all payments in full through queueing and splitting.
  366.2 Lombard loans, no queueing
Recall that the amounts M1 =5 0and M2 =8 0are available for lending to banks 1
and 2, respectively. These amounts have to be allocated optimally throughout the
day to each bank. Thus if bank 1 needs $10 in the morning, it will have only $40
available at noon, and so on.
The primal solution is:















































                 

Notice that bank 2 and the Central Bank entered into a repurchase agreement
at noon. Bank 2 got a Lombard loan of $10 at noon from the Central Bank and
paid it back in the end of the day.

























This example shows that replacing queueing/no loans by loans/no queueing did
not enhance the ﬂow of payments. It achieved the same minimum liquidity, $6.67,
that queueing allowed the system to achieve.
  37The dual solution is:













































































                             

The dual value is 640, so there is no duality gap. The shadow-price of bank 1’s
credit constraint at the end of the day is ξ
∗
1(t2)=8 0 . For the system to be liquidity-
eﬃcient, systemic liquidity has to be reduced by $6.67. Alternatively, the total ﬂow
of payments has to be increased by $20. Thus the amount of credit available to bank
1 has to be increased by $w,w h e r ew solves w × ξ
∗
1(t2)=$ 2 0 ,t h a ti s ,w =$ 0 .25.
6.3 intraday interbank market with queueing
Consider an RTGS system with queueing, but assume that the Central Bank pro-
vides no intraday liquidity. Then banks have to rely on an interbank intraday
money market. For simplicity we assume that such market is interest-rate-free, but
we can easily introduce interest rates for intraday loans between banks and even get
shadow-prices associated with them.
T h ec h o i c ev a r i a b l eυij(s,t) is now free. However we keep the constraint 0 6
P
t>s υij(s,t) 6 1, ∀s.
We call the constraint above the consistency constraint. If it holds with equality,
it says that payments, however queued, have to be fully settled by the end of the day.
  38For simplicity we assume it holds with inequality, which means that a portion of
payments may remain unsettled by the end of the day, leaving room for an overnight
interbank market.
The solution to the primal is:



































                 

Bank 1 settles its morning payment, x12(to)=8 0 , at full and lends 25% of it,
1
4 × 80 = $20, to bank 2 in the morning. Bank 2 pays its morning payment at full.
Bank 2 will repay the $20 loan in the end of the day, as can be seen form the solution
υ12(to,t 2)=−1
4, i.e., bank 1 “pays” υ12(to,t 2)x12(to)=−1
4 × 80 = −$20 to bank 2
i nt h ee n do ft h ed a y ,w h i c hm e a n st h a tb a n k1 actually receives it from bank 2.
From υ12(t1,t 1)=2
3 and υ12(t1,t 2)=1
3, we get that bank 1 settles 2
3 of its noon
payment and queues 1
3 for settlement at the end of the day.























Therefore, given total reserves,
P
i Bi
o =2 2 0 , the optimal arrangement of queue-
ing and interbank intraday money market led the payments system to operate at its
full capacity. All the reserves were used for settlement, no reserve money remained
unused.
  39Notice that payments add up to $720,b u to n l y$660 were settled. This is be-
cause total reserves were $220 (multiplying it by the number of periods, 3,w eg e t
$660). Here there is no need to determine shadow-prices, since the system is already
liquidity-eﬃcient.
6.4 Net debit caps
Given the shadow-prices calculated in the case of queueing, we get average shadow-





2 =1 , ¯ µ∗
12 = 80
3 , and ¯ µ∗
21 =0 . Therefore optimal net debit


















o(1 − ¯ λ2) − ¯ µ21
¯ λ2
=
120(1 − 1) − 0
1
=0
Hence bank 1 should be granted with a $10 net debit cap whereas bank 2 is not
granted any net debit cap.
7C o n c l u s i o n
Our model provides a simple framework for the understanding of real-time gross
settlement systems. It is well known that RTGS systems reduce systemic risk but
are costly for banks in terms of liquidity. Our model shows how to minimize this
cost by designing queueing arrangements, Central Bank credit lines, and splitting
of payments in an optimal way. The main contribution of our model is the focus on
the dual problem. If the Central Bank knew the shadow-prices of banks, it could
set liquidity-eﬃcient intraday monetary policies by controlling reserve requirements,
  40intraday interest rates, credit lines, extension of intraday interbank exposures, etc.
The fundamental equation for liquidity-eﬃciency tells us that such policies should
be personalized. Each bank would be priced according to its marginal contribution
to the total outﬂow of payments.
Of course in real life the Central Bank does not know ex ante the pattern of
interbank transfers. After business hours, however, it has the complete data set of
interbank transfers during that day. Suppose it uses such data to run the primal
problem and to calculate the collection of individual daily shadow-prices. The primal
solution will tell the Central Banker how intraday monetary policies should have
been set in the ﬁrst place in order to make the payment system liquidity-eﬃcient
that day. The dual solution will give the Central Banker an objective policy standard
to pricing banks according to their marginal contribution to the overall stability (or
instability) of the payment system. Shadow-prices can be calculated on a day-by-day
basis. Besides, our model shows that the relevant shadow-price of an individual bank
is the average of its shadow-prices within the day. After collecting a long series of
individual daily shadow-prices, the means of individual empirical distributions will
give a good measure of the true shadow-prices of individual banks. It is these mean
shadow-prices that can be used by monetary authorities to regulate payment systems
eﬃciently. Knowing the initial reserve shadow-price of a bank is close to zero, it
makes no sense for the Central Bank to increase its reserve requirements. Knowing
that bilateral exposure shadow-prices of a bank is well above unity, it is better for
the Central Bank to fetter its bilateral exposures in the intraday interbank market.
Our model therefore provides a solid foundation for the microprudential surveillance
of payment systems6.
Future tasks include the extension of the model to a many-days environment
in which overnight interbank loans would play a prominent role, thus bridging the
gap between intraday monetary policy and medium and long-run macroeconomic
monetary policy. Our model can be used to determine shadow-prices of banks in
6The stochastic version of the model with continuous time is also available.
  41real world payment systems, provided data on intraday interbank transfers are made
available. Indeed, as a by-product, our model shows that the available data on
intraday interbank transfers should be disaggregated.
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